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Finality and Fairness in Grievance Arbitration:
Whether Allegations of Unfair Representation
Justify Termination of Arbitration
The confluence of conventional notions of individual liberty
and public policy in industrial relations is frequently turbulent.
Perhaps the turbulence is most apparent when the interests of an
individual employee flow counter to the interests of both management and organized labor. This circumstance may arise when the
employee's union unfairly represents him in a grievance proceeding against management. In such a circumstance, the individual
need for fair representation clashes with policies favoring exclusive union representation and adherence to grievance procedures
outlined in the applicable collective bargaining agreement. This
Comment will consider the clash as it has arisen a t the arbitration
stage of grievance proceedings, specifically concentrating on the
question whether arbitration of a grievance should go forward
when the grievant complains that his union has breached its duty
of fair representation and conspired with management to deprive
him of his rights under the collective bargaining agreement.
To set the stage for an analysis of this question, this Comment will consider the national labor policies involved in grievance arbitration, particularly focusing on the doctrine of arbitral
finality and the "exhaustion of remedies" requirement. The nature of the duty of fair representation will be briefly considered,
and case law relating to the question whether grievance arbitration should go forward when a grievant contends he is not being
fairly represented will also be reviewed. Finally, the issue will be
analyzed from the standpoints of law and policy in an effort to
distill a reasonable resolution of the problem.

Over a period of several years, the evolution of national labor
policy has produced two doctrines that have particular impact on
the issue under consideration. One of these-the doctrine of arbitral finality-basically provides that arbitral awards are final and
not subject to judicial view.l The other is the exhaustion of reme1 . See Comment, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 936,948-50(1976).
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dies doctrine. It provides that a grievant must exhaust his remedies under the collective bargaining agreement before bringing
his grievance to the courtr~om.~
Each of these doctrines, the labor
policies behind them, and their exceptions, will be considered in
turn.
A. Finality
Most collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitral
finality. Conclusiveness is generally expected even in the absence
of any explicit agreement to that effect? This expectation clearly
accords with section 203 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
which provides that "[fJinal adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement."4
If finality is to have any real meaning, arbitral awards should
not be subject to judicial review. The strength of the doctrine in
fact depends on judicial deference to arbitral determinations.
Courts have generally supported the doctrine. In the seminal
Steelworkers T r i l ~ g y for
, ~ example, the Supreme Court took a
position hostile to judicial review of arbitration.' In analyzing the
issues involved in arbitral solutions to industrial disputes, the
Court noted that "[alrbitration is a stabilizing influence only as
it serves as a vehicle for handling any and all disputes that arise
under the agreement."' The Court, therefore, ruled that the
means chosen by the parties should be given "full play? "Full
play" could be possible only if courts refrained from "usurping"
the functions entrusted to the arbitration tribunal by the parties
themselve~.~
Although the principles of finality articulated in the
2. See Simpson & Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual
Employee, 51 lhx. L. REV. 1179, 1185-1214 (1973).
3. See Comment, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing B o b lems of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 936, 948-49 (1976).
4. 29 U.S.C. 8 173(d) (1970).
5. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
6. See Naffziger, All Power to the Arbitrator: The Aftermath of the Steelworkers
Trilogy, Collyer Wire and ENA, 12 AM.Bus. L.J. 295, 296-99 (1975); Smith & Jones, The
L.
Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MICH.
REV. 751, 751-61 (1965).
7. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
8. Id. at 566.
9. Id. at 569.
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Steelworkers Trilogy are still powerful, there are several exceptional situations in which judicial review is permitted. Section 10
of the United States Arbitration Actlocatalogues grounds for the
vacation of an arbitral award. Under the Act, finality is not a bar
to review when the arbitration process has been infected by fraud,
corruption, or partiality, or when the arbitrator has exceeded his
power or has been guilty of misconduct prejudicial to the rights
of any party? An important judicial exception to the finality
doctrine was recognized in the relatively recent case of Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., l2 where the Supreme Court ruled that
if the union breaches its duty of fair representation to the grievant
so as to undermine "the integrity of the arbitral process," the bar
of finality is removed.13The effect of this decision is to permit a
grievant to sue his employer after an adverse arbitration award
has been rendered if it can be proved that the union has breached
its duty of fair representation.
The duty of fair representation is a concept that must be
understood to appreciate the justification for this judicial exception to finality. But because the same exception is applicable to
the exhaustion of remedies requirement, it will be helpful to consider that requirement before investigating the duty of fair representation.

B. Exhaustion of Remedies
Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides for the filing
in federal courts of "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization."14 While the provision on its
face allows breach of contract actions to be brought by either the
union or management, it is not clear whether this language gives
an individual employee the right to sue his employer for an injury. One section 301 ambiguity was resolved in Smith v. Evening
News Association15 when the Supreme Court ruled that the words
"between an employer and a labor organization" modified
"contracts" instead of " ~ u i t s . "But
~ ~ the Court did not deal with
the critical question of standing: Whether the employee in that
10. 9 U.S.C. 0 10 (1970).
11. Id.; see Comment, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing
Problems of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 936 (1976).
12. 424 U.S.554 (1976).
13. Id. at 567.
#
14. 29 U.S.C. 0 185(a) (1970).
15. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
16. Id. at 200.
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case could sue under the collective bargaining agreement.
An answer to the standing question was suggested three years
later in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox. l7 In Maddox, a grievant
brought an action in state court against his former employer for
severence pay that he claimed was due him under the terms of
the collective bargaining contract. The grievant had made no
attempt to utilize a three-step grievance procedure before bringing the court action. The Supreme Court reversed the state court
decision in favor of the grievant, holding that individuals asserting grievances under a collective bargaining agreement must attempt to use the contractual grievance procedures before seeking
judicial resolutions of their grievances. "[Ulnless the contract
provides otherwise," said the Court, "there can be no doubt that
the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his
behalf."18 Since the grievant had not attempted to use the grievance procedure, he was denied access to the court.
In promulgating the requirement that a grievant must attempt to exhaust contractual remedies before seeking judicial
assistance, the Maddox Court stood behind the notion of exclusivity of contractual grievance procedures. "If a grievance procedure cannot be made exclusive," observed the Court, "it loses
much of desirability as a method of ~ e t t l e m e n t . "Exclusivity,
~~
it
said, would promote union prestige with its members and would
serve the employer's interest by limiting the choice of remedies
available to aggrieved employees. In short, exclusivity would promote stability in labor-management relations.'O
The Maddox Court did allow for exceptions to its "attempt"
rule. An employee's suit would not be barred, of course, if the
collective bargaining agreement created a nonexclusive grievance
p r o ~ e d u r e The
. ~ ~ Court also suggested that if an employee found
it impossible to use contractual grievance procedures, the attempt requirement would not apply.22Additionally, the Court
raised the possibility that other forms of redress might be available if the union refused to press, or only perfunctorily pressed,
the individual's claim.23
Since Maddox, the attempt rule has more clearly become an
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

379 U.S. 650 (1965).
Id. at 653 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 657-58.
See id. at 659.
Id. at 652.
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exhaustion req~irement.~'
Generally speaking, the rule has developed that an employee who fails to exhaust all grievance steps,
including arbitration, should not be entitled to sue.25Exceptions
to the exhaustion requirement have also undergone development
since Maddox. One of the most important of these exceptions is
one that is also applicable to the finality requirement: suit is
allowed if the union breaches its duty of fair representation. The
next section will deal with this duty, focusing particularly on how
its breach constitutes an exception to the exhaustion requirement.

C. The Duty of Fair Representation
While increased union strength has generally improved the
worker's position with respect to management, it has tended to
weaken his position with respect to the union itself. It has become
more difficult for the worker to challenge the union from within.26
The duty of fair representation is a judicial doctrine developed to
help remedy the inequities occasionally attending the union's
power as an exclusive bargaining agent.27Under this doctrine, it
is not enough that the union merely represent employees in a
confrontation with management-it must represent them fairly.
The doctrine of fair representation is said to have been first
applied in the 1944 case of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroadz8to prevent a union from amending a collective bargaining agreement to exclude black employees from railroad work.29
The Supreme Court found that the Railway Labor Act provision30
which permitted the election of an exclusive bargaining agent
also required a corresponding duty to protect the interests of
every employee within the represented craft.31
Although Steele was decided under the exclusive representation provisions of the Railway Labor Act, its rationale compelled
24. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967).
25. See Simpson & Berwick, supra note 2, at 1186.
L.
26. See Note, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX.
REV. 1119, 1119-21, 1178 (1973).
27. See Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK
L. REV.1096,
1099 (1974); Note, The Duty of Fair Representation and Exclusive Representation in
Grievance Administration: The Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE
L. REV.1199,
1199-1201 (1976). This exclusive status is a product of 5 9 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. 4 159 (1970).
28. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
29. See Flynn & Higgins, supra note 27, at 1101.
30. 45 U.S.C. 4 152 (1970).
31. 323 U.S. at 202.
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a similar result in Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23,32which involved
the exclusivity provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). Syres dealt with a union attempt to create a racially
discriminatory seniority system. The Supreme Court's refusal to
permit such a scheme suggested that the duty of fair representation applied to the NLRA.33
The evolution of the doctrine continued in National Labor
Relations Board decisionss4and court opinions,35but the most
definitive statement of the duty appeared in the Supreme Court's
decision of Vaca v. Sipes." Vaca involved a suit by an employee
against his union for the union's alleged arbitrary refusal to take
his grievance to arbitration under the procedures of the collective
bargaining agreement. The employee, Owens, had been discharged on the ground of poor health. During the fourth step in
the grievance p r o c e d ~ r e sthe
, ~ ~union sent him to a physician for
a complete physical examination. Upon receipt of an unfavorable
report from the physician, the union decided not to take the
grievance to a r b i t r a t i ~ nOwens
. ~ ~ sued the union for "arbitrarily,
capriciously and without just or reasonable reason or cause" refusing to proceed further.39
The ultimate question presented in Vaca concerned the remedies available to an employee when his employer breaches the
terms of the contract and his union refuses to invoke grievance
procedures on his behalf. The Court answered the question by
holding that the employee will be excused from the exhaustion of
remedies requirement and will be permitted a judicial resolution
of his grievance upon proving that his union's refusal to invoke
the grievance procedures was in breach of its duty of fair representation? The Court also articulated a standard for testing al32. 350 U.S. 892, rev'g per curiam 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
33. See Flynn & Higgins, supra note 27, a t 1102.
34. See, e.g., Independent Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (union
certification revoked where union practiced segregation and discriminated on the basis of
race in determining eligibility for full membership); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181
(1962) (union's arbitrary demotion of employee was unfair labor practice), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
35. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964) (union's broad authority
as bargaining agent is accompanied by duty of fair representation).
36. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
37. The fifth and final step was arbitration. Id. a t 175 n.3.
38. Id. at 175. Some earlier medical reports had supported Owens' position. Id. a t
174-75.
39. Id. a t 173.
40. Id. at 186. This rule has been criticized as imposing too great a burden on an
individual grievant. See, e.g., Flynn & Higgins, supra note 27, at 1108-09;Note, The Duty
of Fair Representation and Exclusive ~ e ~ r e s e n t a t i oinn Grievance Administration: The
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leged breaches of the duty: "A breach of the statutory duty of fair
representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a
member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."41
To some extent, the Court's unwillingness to grant the individual employee "an absolute right to have his grievance taken
to a r b i t r a t i ~ n "reflects
a theory of industrial relations developed
~~
by Professor Archibald Cox that places a premium on union control over grievance prosecution^.^^ In a discussion citing Professor
Cox, the Court observed that a grievance settlement procedure
giving the union discretion in invoking remedies eliminates fiivolous grievances, promotes consistent treatment, and assists the
resolution of contractual ambiguities. Moreover, "the settlement
process furthers the interest of the union as statutory agent and
as coauthor of the barbaining agreement in representing the employees in the enforcement of that agreement."44 On the other
hand, if the employee could compel arbitration over union objections, more grievances would go to costly arbitration and the
employees' reliance on the union could be ~ n d e r m i n e d . ~ ~
Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE
L. REV.1199, 1200 (1976).
41. 386 U.S. at 190.
42. Id. a t 191.
43. Professor Cox gives several "strong reasons for concluding that the bargaining
representative ought to have power under a broad industrial agreement to control the
prosecution of claims for breach of contract." Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69
HARV. L. REV.601, 625 (1956). Paraphrased, his arguments are:
(1) The union may be the only party qualified to prosecute the claim.
(2) The group of employees may be affected by future implications of a grievance ruling to an extent that outweighs the individual claim for relief.
(3) Many claims of contract violation affect employees other than those directly damaged.
(4) Vesting grievance control in the union increases the likelihood of uniformity while it reduces the chances for discrimination and competition.
(5) Competition between employee groups can promote plant unrest and deter
the union from taking a responsible position.
(6) The union can resolve conflicting interests among employees.
See id. He also lists several disadvantages to giving individual grievants sole right to
prosecute claims:
(1) It disregards established practice.
(2) I t exposes the grievant to a situation of unequal bargaining power.
(3) I t disregards group interests.
(4) It compels tenuous line drawing between suits for individual damage and
claims only the group can present.
(5) It is contrary to the implications of NLRA 5 8(a)(5).
See id.
44. 386 U.S. a t 191.
45. Of course, the approach taken by the Court does not give the union absolute
control over grievance proceedings. Indeed, the Court's effort in Vaca can be seen as one
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Thus, it is clear from Vaca that an employee may escape the
strict confines of grievance procedures and the exhaustion of remedies requirement if he can show that his union breached its duty
of fair representation. Unanswered by Vaca is whether a grievant
can compel a judicial resolution of his claim against management
when the union continues to prosecute his grievance through arbitration, but prosecutes it in a manner that breaches the duty of
fair representation. In short, can the grievant enjoin the arbitration proceeding by alleging a breach of the duty? This question
has been discussed by several courts, but the judicial results have
not been consistent. In order to suggest a possible consistent result, it will be useful to consider how courts have dealt with the
issue.
AND THE ARBITRATION
STAGE:
DI. Exmusno~OF REMEDIES
THECASELAW
The earliest judicial decision articulating a clear stand on the
issue was Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2.46The case involved
a complaint by the administrators of Louis Hiller's estate that the
decedent had been unlawfully discharged from employment with
the "knowledge, consent and connivance" of his union. The defendants moved in the district court for a stay pending arbitration, and the motion was granted. The issue was thus presented
whether allegations amounting to a breach of the duty of fair
representation4' were sufficient to overcome the contractual provision requiring the arbitration of such disputes. The appellate
court held that the allegations were sufficient, reasoning that

where the employee's case is based upon a conspiracy between
his union and his employer to deprive him of his rights he cannot
be forced to submit that issue to an arbitration between the
employer and the union. Such a procedure would fail completely
to settle the issues between the union member and his union. It
would entrust representation of the employee to the very union
which he claims refused him fair representation, and it would
present as adversaries in the arbitration procedure the two parties who, the employee claims, are joined in a conspiracy to
defraud him.48
-

- -

of attempting to balance competing interests of employer, union, and employee-with the
duty of fair representation serving as the medium of balance. See Comment, Protection
of Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining: The Need for a More Definitive Standard
of Fair Representation Within the Vaca Doctrine, 14 VILL.L. REV. 484, 494 (1969).
46. 338 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1964).
47. Id. at 779.
48. Id.
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If such a conspiracy prevents a fair representation of the
employee's interests in arbitration, one possible solution would be
to permit the employee himself to appear or be represented in the
proceeding. Apparently, the lower court had approved of just
such an arrangement in its order. The circuit court found the
proposed solution to be inadequate:
[Tlhis arrangement fails to cure the defects, since the plaintiffs
would still be aligned on the side of their adversary the union
or, if not, the order would have to be construed as forcing the
plaintiffs to arbitrate issues with employer and union which
neither they nor their decedent ever agreed to arbitrate.49

Having reached these conclusions about the effect of a breach of
the duty of fair representation on arbitral fairness and the inadequacy of the lower court's solution to the problem, the Second
Circuit reversed the order granting a stay of judicial action.
A similar approach on different facts was again used by the
Second Circuit in Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid CO.~O
In that
case, Desrosiers sued his former employer and union. He alleged
that the employer's failure to transfer him to another job for
medical reasons constituted a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. He charged the union with a breach of the duty
of fair representation for its failure to assist him in seeking the
transfer. Jurisdiction was sought, in part, under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act. An earlier action by Desrosiers
had been dismissed because he had failed to use the grievance
machinery. On this second attempt, the plaintiff alleged that a
conspiracy between the union and his employer had deprived him
of his rights. The lower court ruled against Desrosiers on a motion
for summary judgment. The issue ultimately presented on appeal
concerned the circumstances under which an individual employee "is required to exhaust grievance procedures provided by
a collective bargaining agreement between his employer and his
union before he may maintain suit in the courts to enforce rights
under that agreement. "51
The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of Desrosiers' action. Noting that the "somewhat inartistically drawn" allegations
of the complaint were sufficient to charge a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation under Vaca and were similar to the
charge made in Hiller, the court indicated that pursuit of a rem49. Id. at 779-80 (emphasis in original).
50. 377 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1967).
51. Id. at 867.
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edy under the contractual grievance machinery might have been
futile." This fact was enough for the action to survive a motion
to dismiss-there were "genuine issues of material fact to be
tried."53
~ * Fourth Circuit reafIn Lusk u. Eastern PToducts C ~ r p . ,the
firmed the rule articulated in Hiller and Desrosiers even though
the case was decided against the grievants. The plaintiffs in Lusk
were opposed to a freezing of working shifts agreed to by the union
and management. A grievance was presented to the company by
the union on behalf of the dissatisfied employees, but nine days
later the grievants filed a section 301 action. The district court
stayed its own proceedings pending final arbitration. During the
stay, the grievance was processed without resolution. Ultimately,
arbitration was scheduled. The grievants were invited to attend
the arbitration hearings, to participate in them, and to be represented by counsel.55The arbitrator's decision was that the grievance was without merit. Following this decision, the district
court granted motions by union and management to dismiss the
plaintiffs' complaint. On appeal, the plaintiffs complained, inter
alia, that it was error to require them to submit to arbitration.
The Fourth Circuit first noted that it was "established that
federal courts have jurisdiction under 8 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act where a member of a union charges that his
union breached its duty to fairly represent him by colluding with
the company to deprive him of his rights."56But, said the court,
when allegations of a breach of the duty of fair representation are
merely "conclusory," they fail to state a valid claim.57The court
determined that this was the case here, since no specific factual
allegations supported the charges. However, the district court
had dismissed the complaint, not for its conclusory nature,
but on the theory that plaintiffs were required to submit the
subject of their complaint to arbitration, that all questions
raised in plaintiffs' complaint had been resolved adversely to
plaintiffs by the arbitrator and that the arbitrator's holdings
were binding upon the court and upon plaintiff^.^^
-

52. Id. at 870-71.
53. Id. at 871.
54. 427 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1970).
55. Id. at 707. Counsel for the grievants did attend and participate, but announced
that he would not "actually enter into the grievance process." Id.
56. Id. at 708.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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This holding, said the court, was incorrect.
The proper rule was declared by the court to be that articulated in the Hiller case? But despite its adherence to the HillerDesrosiers rule, the court affirmed the lower decision, refusing to
upset a correct result that was incorrectly reasoned.60The court
did not discuss the advisability of including the grievants in the
arbitration proceeding, but inasmuch as they were represented in
the proceeding that occurred, the implication is that the court
perceived that remedy as inadequate.
It should be noted that federal courts have not been alone in
accepting the Hiller-Desrosiers rule. The Supreme Court of Oregon, for example, has clearly aligned itself with the approach of
the cases discussed in this section. In Wagner v. Columbia Hospital Distri~t,~'
that court was faced with a wrongful discharge action by a former employee who alleged that the discharge
stemmed from a conspiracy between union and management to
violate her civil rights. Both union and management had filed
motions to abate the action and to require arbitration under the
terms of the collective agreement. The motions had been granted,
and the plaintiff appealed.
The court observed that in the "normal" situation, national
labor policies would be served by not allowing arbitration to be
frustrated by the bringing of court actions. But his approach,
noted the court, is "based upon the assumption that the interests
of the employee will be fairly represented by the union."62When
a conspiracy between union and management is alleged, however,
that assumption fails. The court rejected the contention that the
grievant must "utilize the grievance procedure to the point where
she can claim the union did not give her fair representation as a
condition precedent to her filing the l a ~ s u i t . "Instead,
~
the court
articulated the following rule:
[I]f the complaint of a discharged employee alleges facts from
which it appears that the interests of the employee will not be
fairly represented by the union in an arbitration proceeding,
with the result that such a remedy would be useless and futile,
a motion to abate such proceedings . . . to require the employee
to submit his claim to arbitration . . . will be denied. In such a
case the trial court must then proceed to determine, by trial if
--

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.; see text accompanying note 48 supra.
427 F.2d at 708.
259 Or. 15, 485 P.2d 421 (1971).
Id. at 24, 485 P.2d at 425.
Id. at 27, 485 P.2d at 427.
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necessary, whether plaintiff can prove the allegations of his
complaint.64
Under the facts of the case, the court determined that requiring
arbitration to proceed would be futile and that the plaintiff could
not expect fair representation of her interests by the union.65
Several courts, however, have not followed the HillerDesrosiers rule. The most significant departure from that rule
occurred in the recent case of Hotel & Restaurant Employees &
Bartenders International Union u. Michelson's Food Services,
Inc? The Michelson's case featured a complaint by a grievant
that the employer, Michelson's, had failed to pay over $30,000
due him under a labor agreement. The grievant, Manning, initiated a grievance action by filing a written complaint with the
union. When the union was unable to reach agreement with
Michelson's in the first two stages of the dispute resolution proced ~ r e , it
~ 'demanded binding arbitration of the grievance. On the
day of the arbitration hearing, Manning appeared with his attorney and accused the union of conspiring with Michelson's to deny
him the compensation and insisted that the union could not fairly
represent him. Manning's attorney requested that the union be
joined as a defendant, that the arbitrator be empowered to grant
compensatory and punitive damages against both defendants,
and that Manning be allowed to represent the entire class of
similarly situated employees. The union agreed to allow Manning
and his counsel to direct the case, but Michelson's said it would
not submit to arbitration unless Manning agreed to be bound by
the decision, something that Manning refused to do.
When the parties were unable to reach agreement, the arbitrator took it upon himself to issue an interim award providing
that (1) Manning would be designated as a party to the action
and would be bound by the decision, (2) any other employees
could be joined in the proceeding, and (3) punitive damages,
costs, and attorneys' fees might be awarded against either the
union or Michelson's. The union was directed to petition a court
for enforcement of this award, and enforcement was sought in a
California state court. Removing the case to federal district court,
64. Id. at 27-28, 485 P.2d at 427.
65. Other cases taking essentially the same approach include Glover v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969); S m i t h v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870
(3d Cir. 1972); Sheridan v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2, 444 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1971).
66. 545 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1976).
67. The collective bargaining agreement created a three-step dispute resolution procedure, with the final step being binding arbitration. Id. at 1250.
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Michelson's opposed the petition. Finding that the arbitrator's
award exceeded the scope of his authority, the district court denied enforcement.
Ruling on an appeal brought by the union, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that arbitration between the union and Michelson's should go forward with Manning as a party, but that the
arbitration should be limited to Manning's grievance against
Michelson's without provision for punitive damages. The court
found nothing in the collective bargaining agreement that would
allow arbitration of Manning's claim against the union. In response to the argument that the arbitration should not go forward
when the grievant complains of union breach of the duty of fair
representation, the court said that the federal policies involved in
the arbitration of grievances should prevent the abortion of the
proceeding, particularly when charges of the breach were first
asserted a t the arbitration stage of the dispute resolution procedure. In reaching its decision the court was forced to cope with
the weight of contrary authority. Acknowledging the implications
of Hiller, Desrosiers, Lusk, and Wagner, the court strained, rather
unconvincingly, to distinguish the four cases. Ultimately, the
court admitted that it was "quite impossible" to reconcile everything courts had said about the issue." It further confessed that
its determination that arbitration should proceed when the
grievant complains of a conspiracy between labor and management was not a happy solution. Nevertheless, the court said it
was a solution that comportd with the spirit of judicial decisions
defining national labor policies."
Another departure from the Hiller-Desrosiers rule may be
found in the opinion of the Pennsylvania district court in
Aldridge v. Ludwig-Honold Manufacturing CO.'O In A ldridge, an
employee brought suit against his employer for breach of the
collective agreement with respect to his being laid off and later
rehired a t an inferior grade. He also sued the union for a breach
of the duty of fair representation. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust the grievance machinery. The court entered judgment for
the defendants, ruling that any lower level union decision not to
68. Id. at 1254.
69. In this connection, the court referred to Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967);
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); and the Steelworkers Trilogy, 363 U.S. 564,574,
593 (1960). These cases articulate the view that grievance disputes are basically to be
resolved by the collective parties outgide of the courtroom.
70. 385 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 1397 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 937 (1975).
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prosecute a grievance must be appealed to a higher level within
the union's grievance procedure before a judicial action could be
brought. The grievant had not done so, but instead had alleged
that there was a conspiracy between union and management. The
court rejected the excuse, declaring that the policy of forestalling
judicial interference with internal union affairs should not be
circumvented when an employee alleges the existence of a conspiracy between union and management."
IV. WEIGHING
THE ALTERNATIVES
The foregoing review of judicial authority makes it apparent
that several courts would permit a grievant to secure a stay of
arbitration proceedings if he alleges the existence of a conspiracy
between his union and management to deprive him of his rights.
The obvious alternative approach to the problem is simply to
permit arbitration to generate a result that can be judicially reviewed if the grievant establishes a valid ground for upsetting the
award. This latter approach is basically what the Michelson's
court chose-with the significant twist of sanctioning a tripartite
arbitration proceeding to ensure representation of the grievant's
interests. Each of these approaches will now be evaluated in an
effort to define which solution, if any, is most satisfactory.
A. Stay of Arbitraton

A basic justification for staying arbitration when the grievant
alleges that the arbitral parties are conspiring against him is that,
if the allegation is true, the resulting award will be essentially
meaningless. In such a circumstance, the "adversaries" will really
be allies, and the arbitrator will only be presented with those
facts and those agruments that will point to a result desired by
the conspirators. The result will not be reflective of the grievant's
interests or of reality. Therefore, the argument goes, the arbitration should be stayed, pending proof of the grievant's allegation
of conspiracy.
The major national labor policy that would be served by this
solution to the problem is that the collective bargaining agreeA stay of arbitration, in this context,
ment should be enfor~ed.'~
71. Id. at 699. It is not clear from the opinion whether the court was influenced by
what may have been the "conclusory" nature of the conspiracy allegation. As evidenced
by the discussion in Lusk, a conclusory allegation will not pass muster in some courts.
See note 57 and accompanying text supra. But see Fiore v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255
F. Supp. 596 (M.D.
Pa. 1966).
72. This has been termed the most important national labor policy underlying § 301
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provides some assurance that the individual rights specified in
the collective agreement will not be violated by a unionmanagement conspiracy. Recourse to the courtroom will also permit the grievant to bring an unfair representation action against
the union.73Continued arbitration, on the other hand, would not
permit the grievant to satisfy his allegations against the union,
at least not until after arbitrati~n.'~
There are other reasons to favor a stay of arbitration as well.
Certainly when an actual conspiracy exists, a termination of arbitration will prevent misuse of the arbitral process and loss of time
and money in a futile proceeding. The difficulty with this argument, of course, is that these economic benefits are not realized
unless a conspiracy is in fact established. If the grievant cannot
demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy or breach of the duty
of fair representation, the court cannot hear the section 301 action
and the case must be resubmitted to arbitration. Inasmuch as it
is no simple matter to prove a breach of the
the economic
argument for a stay of arbitration is not overwhelming.
Perhaps the most persuasive reason for permitting termination of arbitration when the grievant alleges the existence of a
conspiracy is that his individual contractual rights will be most
effectively supported by a stay. This focus on individual rights,
however, seems to run counter to such basic collectivist notions
as maintaining industrial peace, preserving union prestige in the
bargaining unit, and promoting industrial self-government
-notions underlying current national labor policy. By taking the
grievance prosecution out of the established grievance machinery,
it may be argued, all of these collective interests are impaired.
These collective concerns, however, may be more relevant to the
negotiating side of industrial relations than they are to the grievance side. In this sense, contractual disputes can be distinguished
from grievance d i s p ~ t e sIn
. ~the
~ former the interests of all union
members and management are a t stake, whereas in the latter the
-

--

--

p
p

-

of the Taft-Hartley Act. See Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor
Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U . TOL.
L. REV.514,533 (1974).
73. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U S . 171 (1967).
74. See Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2, 338 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1964).
75. See Note, The Duty of Fair Representation and Its Applicability When a Union
Refuses to Process an Individual's Grievance, 20 S.C.L. REV. 253, 267-69 (1968); Comment, Post-Vaca Standards of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation: Consolidating
Bargaining Units, 19 VILL.L. REV.885, 901 (1974).
76. See Note, Finality and Fair Representation: Grievance Arbitration Is Not Final
& LEEL. REV.309,
If the Union Has Breached Its Duty of Fair Representation, 34 WASH.
325 (1977); Note, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77
YALEL.J. 559, 562 (1968).
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interests of the individual are more pron~unced.'~
Industrial stability, for example, is not much affected by contrary positions in
a grievance dispute, but it is greatly affected by an impasse in
contract negotiations. Therefore, while it might be entirely proper
to stress collective concerns when a contract is at stake, it is
arguably appropriate to emphasize individual interests when a
grievance is being proces~ed.'~

B. Continuation of Arbitration
There are several "practical" reasons for allowing arbitration
proceedings to continue in the face of allegations of unionmanagement conspiracy. Uninterrupted arbitration is also supported by the policy notions of industrial self-government and
arbitral absolutism announced in the Steelworkers line of cases?
This section will consider practicalities and policies supporting
the continuation of arbitration.
One practical reason not to stay arbitral proceedings is that
an award may issue that will satisfy the grievant. The grievant
may simply be mistaken about the existence of a conspiracy between his union and his employer. Because the union has to work
closely with management on a variety of matters, it may decline
to assume a belligerent bargaining posture on the grievant's
claim. Of course, the lack of belligerence does not necessarily
indicate the existence of a conspiracy, but it may disappoint the
grievant to the extent that he imagines one exists. Even if there
is a conspiracy, it is conceivable that the arbitration award will
satisfy the grievant. The arbitrator is rather free to structure his
awards,80and his resolution may not reflect the wishes of either
conspirator.
Another reason supporting continuation of arbitration is that
it may make little economic sense to terminate an ongoing proceeding. Arbitration represents the last step in the process of
resolving a grievance-it occurs when other efforts have failed. To
suspend the dispute resolution process just before a decision is
reached is wasteful, especially since the allegations of conspiracy
77. Though insofar as a particular dispute resolution establishes a precedent or a
grievance arises out of a common occurrence, the interests of many others may be involved. See Cox, supra note 43, at 615.
78. The failure to recognize this distinction may lead to harsh results. See Note,
Finality and Fair Representation: Grievance Arbitration Is Not Final If the Union Has
& LEEL. REV.309, 325 (1977).
Breached Its Duty of Fair Representation, 34 WASH.
79. See notes 5-9 and accompanying text supra.
80. See generally Naffziger, note 6 supra.
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may be untrue or unprovable. Rather than terminate nonjudicial
efforts to resolve the dispute a t this late stage, why not let them
continue? After an arbitration award issues, a dissatisfied grievant could seek to upset it by alleging conspiracy and breach of
the duty of fair representation. If these allegations prevail, he
may have a judicial resolution of his claim. If they fail, there will
already have been a determination of the issue.
Policy justifications for permitting arbitration to continue
may be more important than practical ones. Recalling that the
policy of preserving industrial stability depends in part on the
union's prestige and support in the bargaining unit, it may be
contended that a suspension of arbitration could adversely affect
these interests by challenging the union's competence to represent members of the bargaining unit. Such a suspension could
undermine the level of union support by communicating either
that the bargaining agent is not to be trusted or that the grievance
machinery is ineffectual. In extreme cases, diminished support
for one bargaining agent might encourage employee unrest or
recognitional rivalry among several unions. It could also deter
management from cooperating with the union. This would undermine industrial stability.
Admittedly, the risk of industrial instability may not be particularly great in this context. Indeed, it might be observed that
the risk actually extends both ways. If a grievant were unable to
receive prompt and fair resolution of his claim due to a unionmanagement conspiracy (or what he believed was one), his dissatisfaction could be infectious.
A stronger policy reason against permitting a stay of arbitration to issue upon an allegation of conspiracy is that intervening
judicial supervision would tend to substitute a government decision for industrial self-determination-at least to the extent that
the arbitration proceeding represents a choice of the collective
parties. This policy in favor of industrial self-determination is the
one so strongly emphasized in the arbitration context in
Steelworkers. To upset the mechanism of industrial decisionmaking in its latter stages seems to denigrate the Steelworkers approach.
This argument is persuasive when there is in fact no conspiracy. If the allegations of conspiracy are true, however, the contention loses much of its force: Why shoud the courts defer to industrial self-government when that government is despotic? Of
course, since there is no way to test the validity of the allegation
without intervening in the arbitral process, it would seem best to
defer to the arbitration procedure until an award is issued.
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Mention should also be made here of the argument that individual interests, because they are more pronounced in grievance
disputes, should permit arbitration to be stayed pending a judicial resolution of the conspiracy claim. This argument more
closely approaches rhetoric than reality. There may be little need
to worry about the inequity of supporting collective interests at
the expense of individual ones, since continued arbitration may
not be actually incompatible with individual interests. Indeed, it
may be averred that continued arbitration both preserves the
purity of the grievance machinery while it permits the individual
to have eventual redress in the face of a conspiracy. This is possible because the arbitration award will be upset if the individual
grievant can show grounds for vacation under section 10 of the
Arbitration Act8*or can demonstrate that the union has breached
its duty of fair representati~n.~~
In view of the possibility of an
arbitral upset, it can be maintained that the grievant alleging a
conspiracy loses nothing more than a little time if the arbitration
continues to an end. When the award is made, the grievant can
then approach the court to have it vacated on appropriate
grounds. If his conspiracy allegation has merit, it will permit him
to have his day in

C. Tripartite Arbitration
One significant variation on the theme of continuing the arbitration despite an allegation of conspiracy is to include the
grievant or his attorney in the arbitral proceeding. The
Michelson's court spoke of this procedure as a means of protecting the interests of the grievant.84Whether or not such a procedure does protect the interests of the grievant is subject to some
question. A further question may be raised about the propriety
of introducing a third party into a contractually established arbitral proceeding.
Certainly the presence of the grievant or his attorney in the
-

-

81. See 9 U.S.C.fi 10 (1970).
82. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Comment, Judicial
Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV.936, 956 n.117 (1976).
83. The force of this contention presumes a judicial willingness to upset an otherwise
final arbitration award when the requisite grounds are established. While it has been
observed that courts are resistant to upsetting awards for breach of the duty of fair
representation, see Tobias, supra note 72, at 537, in the the aftermath of Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), it is likely that courts will be receptive to fair
representation challenges to finality.
84. 545 F.2d at 1252.
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arbitration hearings would seem to ensure that his side of the
matter would be aired. It is conceivable, however, that this advantage would be outweighed by the disadvantages of the arrangement. For example, it is likely that in the context of a conspiracy charge the union would not be vigorous in asserting the
grievant's position. Indeed, if the charges of conspiracy were true,
the arbitral situation would resemble an action by a plaintiff
against codefendants. Such an arbitration lineup may present
difficulties for an arbitrator who is chosen by the collective parties, who is accustomed to dealing with the concerns of collective
parties, and who may be adept at reaching compromises reflecting collective interests. It may be difficult for the arbitrator to be
objective when the collective parties seem to be more or less on
the same side of the issue.
It should be observed, of course, that such tripartite arbitration would not focus explicitly on the question of the union's
breach of the duty of fair representation. Such a claim is not
arbitrable under the contract between labor and management.
But it is nevertheless probable that the conspiracy charges which
justified the tripartite arrangement in the first place would at
least muddy the arbitral waters and perhaps contribute to a
plaintiff-codefendant scenario. It is conceivable, therefore, that
the presence of the grievant or his attorney in the arbitration
hearings will not result in a better outcome for the grievant. Indeed, it is possible that the ultimate outcome could be worse.
Although a grievant can attempt to upset an unfavorable
arbitration award on the ground that the union breached its duty
of fair representation, if the same claim is made following an
arbitral proceeding in which the grievant represented his own
interests, it may be difficult for a court to believe that a union's
breach could have had any effect on the arbitrator's award. That
is, the court may reason that since the grievant himself was allowed to represent his position, the arbitration award could not
have been made without a fair consideration of the grievant's
claim. Once a grievant enters into a tripartite arbitration proceeding, therefore, he may undercut the ultimate strength of his
judicial position.
Perhaps developments like the ones just referred to are unlikely to materialize. It may well be that the benefits of including
a grievant in arbitration hearings outweigh the potential risks.
The risks are not so remote, however, that they should be overlooked.
A further question may be raised about the appropriateness
of the tripartite arrangement. Is i t proper to include what
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amounts to a third party in the arbitration after it has begun?
The question is a serious one because if, as has been judicially
affirmed, the legitimacy of arbitration stems from the parties'
contractual agreement,85it is arguable that the arbitrator's inclusion of a third party in the proceeding goes beyond the scope of
the parties' agreement and therefore beyond the arbitrator's
power.
Tripartite arbitration has been judicially approved in only a
few circumstances. In Transportation- Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific Railroads7and Columbia Broad casting
S y s t e m , Inc. v . A m e r i c a n Recording & Broadcasting
Association, tripartite arrangements were allowed that involved
two unions and one employer where jurisdictional disputes had
arisen between the unions. In these cases the contentions of the
parties lent themselves well to tripartite arbitration.
Aside from Michelson's, no other case seems to have approved a tripartite arrangement in a nonjurisdictional context?
An earlier decision by the Ninth Circuit? however, did contain
language to the effect that the question whether a grievance may
be processed by a bargaining agent or by the grievant himself is
a procedural matter and that procedural matters are left to the
arbitrator's discretion. This case, Association of Industrial Scientists u. Shell Development Co.," can be distinguished from the
situation under consideration here because its focus was not on a
tripartite procedure but rather on one in which either the grievant
or his agent would take the field against management. Nevertheless, the "procedural" theory espoused in that case is applicable
to the tripartite situation and was applied in M i c h e l s ~ n ' s . ~ ~
In addition to the procedural argument for including an individual grievant in arbitration proceedings, it may be useful to
85. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
86. For a discussion emphasizing the advantages of including the grievant in arbitration proceedings, see Rosen, The Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the Problem, 24 MD. L. REV.233 (1964).
87. 385 U.S. 157 (1966).
88. 414 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1969).
89. It should be noted that some commentators have seen in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), a judicial sanction for tripartite
arbitration. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 86, a t 292-93. The Ninth Circuit Court in
Michelson's apparently agreed with these commentators, since it cited Humphrey for the
proposition that the grievant could participate in the arbitration to protect his interests.
545 F.2d a t 1252.
90. 348 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1965).
91. 545 F.2d a t 1252. The ~ i c h e l s o n ' scourt relied on John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964), for the proposition that procedural questions could be
decided by the arbitrator.

152

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

recall that the union is an agent for the grievant in his
While admittedly the union may have more than the individual
,~~
grievant's interests to pursue in a given arbitral p r o ~ e e d i n git
would not seem too outrageous from a legal standpoint to permit
the "principal" to participate with his agent in the dispute resolution process.
In view of the judicial tendency to approve a tripartite arbitral arrangement in cases dealing with jurisdictional disputes between unions, and considering t h e "procedural" approach to the
problem that has achieved judicial sanction, it seems to be legally
appropriate for a court to countenance a tripartite procedure. But
even though legally appropriate, such an arrangement is subject
to the risk that an adverse arbitral award may be more difficult
to upset when the grievant participates in the proceeding.

The court in Michelson's was careful to limit its holding to
the facts before it?* The court did not want to suggest that the
approach it took should be a standard one. Perhaps a standard
solution is impossible. Certainly as long as arbitrators are able to
make significant "procedural" adjustments in their proceedings,
it will not be a simple matter for courts to impose uniformity. And
uniformity may not be advisable in any event-perhaps different
solutions should be devised to deal with different situations.
A uniform approach, however, would have advantages. Certainty would be promoted by a standard solution, and certainty
would contribute to industrial peace. A standard solution could
also ensure that the interests of the individual grievant and the
collective parties would be protected to some extent from discretionary treatment. Furthermore, the difficulty of fashioning
unique remedies for unique fact situations could be alleviated if
a remedy were devised that would apply well to all.
With these considerations in mind, and recalling the arguments for and against alternative solutions, uninterrupted arbitration should be the standard approach to the problem of conspiracy allegations arising at the arbitration stage of grievance
92. The Ninth Circuit pointed out in Michelson's that the union was the grievant's
agent in making, performing, and enforcing the collective agreement. 545 F.2d at 1252.
93. See Note, The Duty of Fair Representation and Exclusive Representation in
Grievance Arbitration: The Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE
L. REV.1199, 1211
(1976).
94. 545 F.2d at 1255. The qualification was: "We say nothing as to what our decision
might be in a different case." Id.
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proceedings. On balance, there seems to be little to lose and much
to gain by having arbitration continue in the face of a conspiracy
charge. The simple reason why is this: The justification for escaping exhaustion is also a justification for upsetting a "final" arbitral award, namely, that the union has breached its duty of fair
representation. In other words, in order to achieve a judicial hearing of his claim, the grievant's hurdle is the same whether he
wishes to abate the arbitral proceeding or upset an unsatisfactory
award. Once a breach of the duty of fair representation is demonstrated, the court will hear the grievance. At this point, it makes
no difference whether an arbital award has been made or
not-the court will decide the issue. But if a breach of the duty
is not demonstrated after termination of arbitation, it makes a
great difference, for there is no arbitral award existing to settle
the dispute. Following the courtroom confrontation, there will
have to be an arbitral resolution. And what would prevent the
grievant from alleging a breach of the duty in a subsequent
arbitration?
It should be recalled that a central theme of national labor
policy is to encourage the nonjudicial resolution of disputes. That
policy theme would suffer were a grievant able to take his case
to court before the nonjudicial machinery could generate a result.
The proposed solution permits the grievance machinery to function through to a conclusion. It also permits the grievant who is
dissatisfied with the result to have a courtroom hearing if he can
demonstrate that the union has breached its duty of fair representation.
The proposed solution will, of course, be an inconvenience to
the grievant who can establish a breach of the union's duty-it
will mean a minor delay of his judicial hearing. But it will not
prevent his ultimate vindication. For the grievant who cannot
demonstrate a breach of the duty, the delay may also be unattractive. But in that case, a final result will have been generated by
the arbitration that will be determinative of the parties' rights.
This result will be both efficient and supportive of national labor
policy.
Tripartite arbitration should not be encouraged. The objective is not that it would be legally inappropriate to add a new
party to the proceeding, but that it might work to the disadvantage of the grievant when an actual conspiracy does exist. It
would probably be more difficult to upset an arbitral award on
unfair representation grounds when the grievant has represented
himself.
The proffered solution is an orthodox one from the stand-
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point of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. It provides that,
once the arbitration stage of the grievance machinery is reached,
the machinery should be allowed to function until a result is
produced. It is conceivable, of course, that this result will not be
a correct one. When the result is erroneous because there has been
a conspiracy between the union and management, the correct
result can only be reached if courts are willing to recognize the
unfair representation exception to the finality rule and review the
arbitral award. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision
, ~more
~ likely than ever
in Hines u.Anchor Motor Freight, I ~ C it. is
that the exception will be applied. Its application in this context
will ensure that individual rights are safeguarded even as collective interests are upheld.

N . Gregory S m i t h
95. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). See text accompaning notes 12-13 supra.

